Greenland as a test case

Over the past years, global affairs have been going through tectonic shifts with rising competition spanning over several domains (energy, trade, defense). While it is fair to say that geopolitics affects climate change, it is equally true the other way around. A vivid example is the Arctic region, where the nexus between climate, security and energy calls for new strategies and visions from the stakeholders involved. The region is currently warming four times faster than the world at large. This dramatic development is rapidly reshaping its geopolitical and economic significance affecting security and governance as the traditional cooperative approach since the end of Cold War is increasingly being replaced by confrontation and competition. Indeed, melting Arctic ice opens new scenarios with new actors striving for control over raw materials and shipping routes. The Arctic resource endowment is well known since 2008 when the US Geological Survey (USGS) assessed that “extensive Arctic continental shelves may constitute the geographically largest unexplored prospective area for petroleum remaining on Earth”. More specifically, it is estimated that the area is home to 13 percent of world’s undiscovered oil and 30 percent of gas. Despite this great potential, the actual development and exploitation activities have moved slowly because of several obstacles faces by each Arctic country and energy companies. Indeed, operators have to deal with high investment and operational costs, technological complexity, extreme and fragile environmental conditions, unstable political support and limited infrastructure.

Among Arctic countries, Russia has been the most committed country to develop its resources, with a rising significance of the Arctic for its export strategy and LNG ambitions. Additionally, it is estimated that the Arctic holds also significant reserves of critical minerals, which are vital input for digital, military and clean energy technologies. Moreover, an ice-free Arctic would facilitate the expansion of three new maritime routes: the Northern Sea Route (NSR) along the Russian coasts, the North-West Passage (NWP) along the North American coastline and the Transpolar Sea Route through the North Pole. These routes have all the potential to shorten trips between Europe, Asia and North America by bypassing busy (and sometimes unsecure) chokepoints. Again, Russia is at the frontline in developing its route which is interlinked with resources exploitation and trade. All these developments have stimulated also non-Arctic countries, especially China, to enhance their presence in the region through investments, political agreements, and scientific partnerships. At the same time, melting ice and global warming poses serious threats to security, stability and ecosystem. For example, projects and infrastructure are at risk of becoming unstable because of permafrost thaw. This challenging environment affects the role key actors, notably the European Union (EU) and NATO, in balancing resilience, resource management, and strategic competition with global actors like Russia and China.

EU-NATO strategies in the Arctic region

These new regional security dynamics pushed both organizations to dedicate growing attention to the Arctic, as evidenced by official documents and strategic policies produced in recent years. Regarding the EU, the first significant strategic document, the Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: An Integrated European Union Policy for the Arctic, dates back to 2016. This document outlines a strategy focused on three key areas: sustainable development, international cooperation, climate change and safeguarding the Arctic environment. It is part of a broader series of diplomatic and political actions that have long signalled Brussels’ increasing interest in the region, exemplified by the EU’s attempt to obtain permanent observer status at the Arctic Council since 2013.

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he EU's Arctic strategy was later updated in 2021 with a subsequent Joint Communication, which, while maintaining its focus on environmental and natural resource issues, also acknowledges the region’s growing importance as an arena of geopolitical competition. This shift is particularly driven by the activism of actors such as Russia and China, which seek to exploit the natural and energy resources that are becoming accessible due to the ice melt. This aspect was further reinforced in the Strategic Compass, published in 2022 after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, in a context where the security and defence dimension of the Arctic has become an integral part of future regional scenarios.
The multidimensional nature of Arctic security—spanning commercial, energy, and military aspects—has also led to increased NATO interest in the region. This is reflected in official documents recognising the need for greater awareness of regional challenges and broader deterrence and defence plans, as stated in NATO 2030: United for a New Era, published in 2020. The war in Ukraine has inevitably accelerated NATO’s strategic posture. The accession of Finland and Sweden—directly triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—has brought seven out of eight Arctic states into the Alliance. The expansion of Russian military capabilities in the region, the deterioration of relations with Moscow, and NATO’s strengthened presence in the Arctic have also led to an increase in military exercises. These drills, previously conducted under the Cold Response Exercise (now Nordic Response), have seen a significant rise in terms of resources deployed and scenarios explored since 2022.
 

The Greenland case

The heated competition around the Arctic is embodied by the case of Greenland. Indeed, it highlights the region’s energy potential, security dynamics, and challenges in maintaining autonomy amid external pressures. Despite being a part of Denmark, Greenland benefits of an enhanced autonomy status with independence aspirations although several socioeconomic challenges. In this challenging scenario, Greenland has gained newfound political relevance especially following US President Donald Trump’s overtures to acquire/control it. Along military and strategic considerations, the US President is particularly interested in securing the supply of critical minerals, of which Greenland is particularly rich, including iron ore, rare-earth elements, uranium and others. Indeed, Greenland holds important reserves of 43 of the 50 “critical minerals” deemed vital to US national and economic security. 

As the world has understood the strategic role played by China in the global mineral supply chains, governments have attempted to reduce their dependence by diversifying supply and value chains. Indeed, China has expanded its role in mineral supply chains thanks to industrial policy, financial support, state-owned companies and mineral diplomacy. Therefore, Washington is not the only player in this diversification quest. In November 2023, the EU has signed a MoU with Greenland for a strategic partnership to develop sustainable raw materials value chains. Indeed, in Greenland 25 of the 34 critical minerals identified by the Commission as strategically important can be found. 
To turn ambition into reality, governments and companies need to overcome massive barriers, which affects economic feasibility of mineral extraction. Lack of infrastructure, human capital, and high operating costs are key factors that prevent mineral extraction, also for Chinese companies. Indeed, China has attempted to enter into Greenland mining sector in the 2010s, but with poor results. For example, China engaged with a rare-earth element project in Greenland which has stalled following a ban on uranium mining in 2021. Moreover, mining activities need to be accepted by the local community given their environmental impact. Environmental concerns and limited economic feasibility are true also for other Greenland’s natural resources, such as hydrocarbon. The USGS that Greenland holds also 7.5 billion undiscovered barrels of oil and 148 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. However, exploration activities have been hindered due to structural challenges and in 2021 ultimately were halted due to climate concerns. 
Lastly, its geographical position allows Greenland to likely become an important player in the rising Arctic shipping. Straddling two Arctic routes (NSR and NWP), it could contribute to ensure management of the Arctic Ocean, including emergency, prevention and response activities by attracting investments and partnerships. 

Forging a unified EU-NATO approach to Arctic security

The growing strategic importance of the Arctic, driven by climate change and the ambitions of Russia and China, calls for a cooperative response from the EU and NATO. As for the EU, it is crucial to develop a coordinated and dedicated Arctic security policy that takes into account Brussels’ diverse interests in the region, from energy security to the protection of trade routes and environmental sustainability. In this context, the future of regional governance becomes a critical issue. Russia’s diplomatic isolation has slowed the work of key regional intergovernmental bodies, from the Arctic Council to the Barents Euro-Arctic Council. If the EU aspires to be a major political player, it should take a central role in redefining the region’s governance architecture, especially as the strategic confrontation with Russia appears set to continue in the long term.
The EU’s limited military presence in the region and the constraints of a solely diplomatic and political approach—thus far pursued by Brussels within the broader Arctic strategic competition—necessitate effective coordination with NATO.

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he Alliance, in turn, must adapt its strategies to the evolving challenges of the Arctic by redefining its role and presence in the region while acknowledging the wide spectrum of security threats that demand a comprehensive response. Avoiding the mere militarization of the Arctic is key. Climate change, acting as a risk multiplier by exacerbating existing vulnerabilities, further underscores the interconnection between security and environmental factors. As climate impacts become more frequent and severe, NATO should enhance its preparedness for climate security challenges in the region to ensure its ability to achieve strategic and operational objectives.

Moreover, addressing the Arctic’s strategic challenges—from hard security threats to climate and environmental issues—requires close cooperation with local communities. These populations are increasingly exposed to the effects of climate change and are on the front lines in managing the consequences of growing competition for the region’s resources. 
Looking ahead, Greenland will serve as a critical test case for understanding not only the future trajectory of regional security dynamics but also the potential synergy between the EU and NATO in the Arctic. President Trump’s aggressive statements regarding the territory of a NATO member and allied country marked an unprecedented episode in the post-World War II international order. So far, Denmark, the EU, and NATO have pursued a strategy of de-escalation, avoiding rhetorical confrontations with Washington to prevent further divisions. However, Greenland’s strategic importance, the stance adopted by the U.S. administration, and the strong local independence movement could once again bring the island to the forefront of geopolitical attention. In this context, Greenland exemplifies the challenges and contradictions posed by the Arctic, underscoring the urgency for the EU to define a clear and up-to-date Arctic policy. Furthermore, a potential internal conflict within the Atlantic Alliance—should Washington’s ambitions grow at Copenhagen’s expense—highlights the need to reestablish a regional governance framework that can mitigate tensions and prevent an unchecked rush for Arctic resources, which would come at the cost of environmental sustainability and international political stability.