The new frontier of global politics 

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ew regions in the world have experienced such rapid changes in the past two decades as the Arctic. The region is warming twice as fast—and in some years three times as fast—as the mid-latitudes. Reduced ice cover results in darker ocean surfaces, which absorb more solar energy, further accelerating the melting of sea ice. This shift has also triggered significant geopolitical realignments in the region. The retreat of the ice has uncovered previously inaccessible resources: according to the US Geological Survey, the Arctic holds about 12.3 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil reserves and 32.1 percent of its undiscovered gas reserves, along with rare earth elements and critical raw materials. This ice retreat has also opened new sea routes, both civilian and military. However, the Arctic’s potential also necessitates further development in terms of ports and infrastructure, all within the framework of environmental sustainability and respect for the region’s fragile ecosystem. 

Crisis of governance 

In a globalized world, where a state’s power is increasingly measured by its control over resources, it was inevitable that the Arctic would become a region of interest for the world’s great powers. Unlike Antarctica, which is a continent surrounded by sea, the Arctic is an ocean surrounded by land. Therefore, it is incorrect to view the Arctic as a race to conquer a terra nullius. As an ocean, the region falls under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which has been ratified by all Arctic states—those whose borders extend beyond the 66th parallel North—except for the United States. Notably, several Arctic states (Russia, Norway, Canada, and Denmark) have submitted requests to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf for an extension of their Exclusive Economic Zones. The United States is likely to be excluded from the negotiations, as 53 percent of the Arctic Ocean is bordered by Russian coasts. 

The eight Arctic states—Russia, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Canada, and the United States—have been cooperating since 1996 under the Arctic Council, the primary intergovernmental forum that promotes cooperation, coordination, and interaction on issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the region. Military and national security matters are deliberately excluded from the Council’s activities to ensure peaceful cooperation among all members. 

The war in Ukraine shifted the internal balance of the Council and triggered a governance crisis in the region. Work was suspended and the Council transitioned to the Arctic7 format, reducing Russia’s ability to exercise its soft power in what had previously been a platform for significant international coordination. Additionally, the rapid accession of Sweden and Finland to the Atlantic Alliance left Russia as the only non-NATO country on the Arctic chessboard. 

Russian strategy and alliance with China  

In reality, the war in Ukraine has only intensified a trend already evident in recent years. Militarily, Russia had long bolstered its presence along its Arctic coasts, modernizing and expanding its bases and infrastructure from Murmansk to Vladivostok. However, these actions should not be seen as a “militarization of the Arctic” by Russia, but rather as a revival of its Soviet-era bases. The “Arctic bastion” doctrine, formulated by the Russian Navy in the 1990s, viewed the ice-protected Arctic as inaccessible to foreign military forces, allowing most of the Northern Fleet to be concentrated in the area and ensuring a timely response in the event of a nuclear confrontation. The Arctic is also the global point of direct confrontation between Russia and the United States. The relocation of NATO bases to Sweden and Finland could shift Russia’s security perceptions in the region, potentially leading to miscalculations and dangerous escalations. 

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dding to this dynamic is Russia’s increasingly close relationship with China in recent years. China, the only Observer to the Arctic Council—granted status in 2013 alongside Italy—has published a White Paper on the Arctic (2018), the first concerning a region outside its borders. Beijing has declared itself a “near-Arctic state” and introduced the concept of the “Polar Silk Road,” which is part of the broader One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative. One aspect to consider is the Arctic route’s potential to connect Asia to Europe while bypassing hot climate passages like Bab El-Mandeb and the Strait of Malacca. The Northern Sea Route, which runs north of Eurasia, offers a significant shortcut for trade between Asia and Europe, potentially reducing travel time by up to 50 percent compared to traditional shipping routes through Panama or Suez. Additionally, we must not overlook China’s investments in the Arctic energy sector, with notable examples being the Arctic LNG and Arctic LNG 2 projects on Russia’s Yamal Peninsula. As Western companies withdraw from Russian Arctic projects, Chinese companies are stepping in, bringing investment and technological support. Chinese investment spans many areas, including the establishment of research stations, increased fishing activities, and investments in mining projects. China’s strategic interest in the region dates back well before 2018, with the Arctic first mentioned in the 2011 Communist Party’s 12th Five-Year Plan. 

Cooperation between China and Russia in this strategic region is indeed raising concerns among Western governments, particularly due to the security implications that extend beyond the Arctic. However, it’s important to note that the Eurasian Arctic is more advanced in terms of human activity and infrastructure. The United States now faces the challenge of bridging the gap that has developed in recent years, especially in military terms. 

The Trump factor 

The Arctic is marked by multiple factors of criticality and instability. This already complex geopolitical environment was further complicated by the election of Donald Trump, who, with aggressive and often brutally blunt declarations of disengagement or annexation, seemed determined to redraw the global order. His actions disrupted established historical, cultural, geographical, and political norms, leaving both allies and adversaries unprepared. 

Then there’s the Atlantic Alliance, whose direction under Trump remains unclear.

Trump’s frequent barrage of foreign policy statements raises significant questions and concerns, particularly regarding their implications for the Arctic region—starting with his comments on Canada and, more specifically, Greenland. Along with Iceland, Greenland has long been a strategic link for the US as part of the “transatlantic bridge” since World War I—an even more sensitive factor today given the US goal of curbing China’s strategic projection. In an area like the Arctic, China’s presence could pose a direct threat to US national security, a central focus of Trump’s foreign policy. 

Then there’s the Atlantic Alliance, whose direction under Trump remains unclear. What is certain, however, is a plan—far from insignificant—to redefine relations between the United States, Canada, and European allies. Considering the Arctic’s development across so many domains—underwater, maritime, terrestrial, and space—we can understand the growing focus from political and military leaders. This reinforces the idea that the Arctic is now a region to be regarded as strategic in every sense, no longer just a scientific collaboration hub that remained largely unaffected by the political “temperatures” and the ice. That’s why the complementary nature of geopolitical interests and both private and public industry will play a central role in shaping the future, not only of Arctic governance but also of the region’s economic development.