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ompared to the specular region to the south, the Arctic has a completely different physical and legal configuration. Antarctica is a continental mass surrounded by water, located south of the 60° South latitude. In this territory, there are no recognized state sovereignties—only sovereignty claims made in the past by seven states (Norway, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, Chile, and Argentina), later joined by the United States and the former USSR. These claims, based on various grounds—from discovery to physical contiguity to climatic influence—have not been recognized and, crucially, have never been backed by effective and exclusive state control that could have turned them into sovereign titles. Moreover, Antarctica has no permanent population—only periodic scientific personnel stationed at research bases. 

The Arctic Ocean, by contrast, lies north of the Arctic Circle at latitudes above 66° North and is surrounded by land belonging to five states: Canada, Denmark (via Greenland), Russia, the United States, and Norway. These states exercise jurisdiction over the Arctic waters and their resources—both renewable and non-renewable—within their respective coastal zones (territorial seas, EEZs, and continental shelves), as defined under international law of the sea. 

Within the Arctic Ocean lies the Svalbard archipelago, under Norwegian sovereignty as established by the 1920 Svalbard Treaty. This treaty resolved a dispute with Russia and recognizes significant economic, settlement, and mineral rights for citizens of the 46 signatory states (including Italy). Also within the region is Hans Island, long disputed by Denmark and Canada, whose sovereignty issue was resolved in 2022. This differing physical configuration underlies the distinct legal regimes that apply to the two polar regions. 

 

The Antarctic system  

Antarctica is administered through a unique form of international cooperation based on the original Antarctic Treaty of 1959. Over the years, this framework has developed certain elements of institutionalization, notably with the establishment of a permanent Secretariat in 2003. However, it does not yet constitute an international organization. 

The Treaty, signed in Washington and originally concluded by 12 states—including the 7 claimant countries, the United States, and the former USSR—now has 58 Parties. In a region not subject to state sovereignty, the Treaty guarantees the exercise of freedoms established under international law, particularly freedom of navigation, overflight, and scientific research. This has fostered broad and productive international collaboration, further supported by the demilitarization of the area and the prohibition of nuclear testing and the disposal of radioactive waste (Articles I and V of the Treaty). 

This form of cooperation, initially focused on scientific research in continuity with the International Geophysical Year of 1958, has gradually extended to include the management of the region’s resources—though primarily from a “conservationist” standpoint centered on environmental protection. The 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty designates Antarctica as “a natural reserve, dedicated to peace and science,” and establishes that any activity in the region must undergo a rigorous environmental impact assessment. It also introduces a ban on mining activities for a period of 50 years from the Protocol’s entry into force in 1998. 

A leading role in the management of the area and its resources is given to the countries with an active interest in the region—the Consultative Parties, currently numbering 29—as demonstrated by their maintenance of permanent scientific stations. 

 

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he success of this cooperative framework is largely due to the restraint of sovereignty claims by the claimant countries, ensured by the “freezing clause” (Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty). These claims, which the system neither recognizes nor denies, have never been converted into actual titles—precisely because of the obligations progressively undertaken by the claimant states. 

A leading role in the management of the area and its resources is given to the countries with an active interest in the region—the Consultative Parties, currently numbering 29—as demonstrated by their maintenance of permanent scientific stations. Italy acquired consultative status in 1987 and currently operates two stations, one of them jointly with France. Measures adopted unanimously by the Consultative Parties during periodic meetings, once ratified or adopted by each party according to its national procedures, constitute Antarctic law. 

 

The legal framework applicable to the Arctic  

In the Arctic, the situation is different. Given the surrounding sovereign states that exercise jurisdiction over the marine areas off their coasts, specific binding agreements—alongside customary international law—apply to the region. Chief among these is the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), signed in Montego Bay in 1982. To date, the Convention has been ratified by 167 states, including all Arctic nations except the United States. The U.S. applies the Convention to the extent that its provisions reflect general international law; however, not being a party, it cannot fully benefit from its provisions, particularly in its relations with other Arctic States. 

In such cases, the Convention imposes a duty of cooperation among coastal states, which may be implemented through the creation of a regional organization to exercise their rights and fulfill their obligations—particularly regarding the protection and preservation of the marine environment.

 

The Convention defines the extent of national jurisdiction and specifies the rights Arctic States may exercise in their coastal zones—territorial waters, exclusive economic zones, and continental shelves—as well as the rights and freedoms available to other states in those areas. Its rules and procedures are essential for resolving any disputes among Arctic States regarding the delimitation of coastal zones and the scope of related rights and obligations1.  

Under UNCLOS, the Arctic Ocean may be classified as an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea—defined as a sea surrounded by two or more states and connected to another sea or the ocean by a narrow passage “consisting entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States” (Art. 122). In such cases, the Convention imposes a duty of cooperation among coastal states, which may be implemented through the creation of a regional organization to exercise their rights and fulfill their obligations—particularly regarding the protection and preservation of the marine environment. Other interested states or international organizations may also be invited by the coastal states to participate in these cooperative efforts (Art. 123). 

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pecific rules on safety and pollution prevention for navigation in Arctic and Antarctic waters are set out in the Polar Code, developed by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and in force since January 2017. 

In environmental matters, the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, to which all Arctic States are parties, applies in the Arctic, alongside other specific agreements concluded within the framework of Arctic cooperation. Also applicable are several treaties binding the Arctic States that prohibit the use of weapons of mass destruction, including the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, the 1971 Seabed Arms Control Treaty, and the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. However, given the presence of sovereign states—two of which are nuclear powers—it is not feasible, especially in the current geopolitical climate, to replicate in the Arctic the model of demilitarization and denuclearization successfully applied in Antarctica. 

 

Governance 

The governance of the Arctic is entrusted to a distinctive form of cooperation led by the Arctic Council. The Council is not an international organization but a permanent forum for cooperation, established through the soft-law Ottawa Declaration signed in 1996 by the eight Arctic States, with the goal of promoting sustainable development in the region. The Council comprises eight Arctic States—the five sovereign states bordering the Arctic (the United States, Russia, Denmark, Canada, and Norway) and three other states historically active in the area (Finland, Iceland, and Sweden); six Permanent Participants, which are organizations representing Arctic Indigenous Peoples; and Observers, which may include non-Arctic states, intergovernmental or inter-parliamentary organizations, and NGOs. A permanent Secretariat was established in 2011. 

Observers have no formal role in decision-making; they may be invited to attend Council meetings and may propose projects—provided they have limited financial impact—only through an Arctic State or a Permanent Participant

 

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he Arctic Council is an exclusive forum in which no new members can be admitted beyond the original eight Arctic States. However, the number of Observers—both states and international organizations—as well as the number of Permanent Participants, can be expanded. 

There are currently 13 Observer States: six are EU Member States (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, and Poland), and seven are non-EU countries (the United Kingdom, China, India, South Korea, Japan, Singapore, and Switzerland). Italy acquired Observer status in 2013. The European Union has held ad hoc observer status since 2013, allowing it to be invited to Arctic Council meetings on occasion. However, the EU is a full member of another regional cooperation forum—the Barents-Euro-Arctic Council—established in 1993, which brings together the European Arctic countries bordering the Barents Sea: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Iceland, Sweden, and Russia. 

Within the Arctic Council, decision-making power rests entirely and exclusively with the eight Arctic States. Indigenous peoples’ organizations, which hold the status of Permanent Participants, have the right to be consulted on issues related to sustainable development and the environment, but they do not participate in the decision-making process. Observers have no formal role in decision-making; they may be invited to attend Council meetings and may propose projects—provided they have limited financial impact—only through an Arctic State or a Permanent Participant. 

Decisions are made by consensus. The Council meets every two years under the rotating chairmanship of one of the Arctic States. Continuity of the cooperative framework is maintained by six Working Groups, coordinated and overseen by the Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs)—representatives of the Arctic States—who meet twice a year. 

The legal instrument that—by express recognition of the Arctic States—forms the framework for Arctic governance is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, to which, as noted, all Arctic States except the United States are parties. The conditions for obtaining Observer status, as set out in the Ottawa Declaration, include recognition of the legal framework applicable to the Arctic, along with explicit acknowledgment of state sovereignty and of the sovereign and jurisdictional rights exercised in the region by the five Arctic coastal states. 

Key aspects of Arctic cooperation include environmental protection, the conservation of Arctic flora and fauna, and scientific research, all in line with the provisions of UNCLOS. In these areas, several agreements have been concluded within the framework of the Arctic Council, generally open only to participation by the Arctic States. 

Military and security issues fall outside the competence of the Arctic Council, as explicitly stated in the Ottawa Declaration. Aside from the demilitarization of Svalbard, established by the 1920 Svalbard Treaty, military activities in the Arctic are not formally prohibited. In recent years, there has been a clear trend among Arctic States toward strengthening their military presence in the region. 

Following Finland’s accession to the Atlantic Alliance on April 4, 2023, and Sweden’s on March 11, 2024, all Arctic Council member states—except the Russian Federation—are now members of NATO. While NATO does not formally maintain bases in the Arctic, some Arctic States—notably Norway and Iceland—permit the use of their bases for NATO military exercises. 

 

Prospects  

This fruitful model of cooperation entered into crisis in 2022, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the resulting sanctions imposed by Western countries. That year, under Russia’s chairmanship, the Arctic Council suspended its work, and all projects and activities involving Russia were halted. In 2023, under Norway’s rotating chairmanship, the Council formally resumed its work—without Russia’s participation. Russia withdrew from the Barents Euro-Arctic Council in 2023 and suspended its voluntary contributions to the Arctic Council in 2024. 

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n recent years, there has been exponential growth in interest from third countries in the Arctic’s strategic significance—particularly in relation to climate, natural resources, transport, and energy production. In 2013, China—self-described as a “near-Arctic country”—signed a free trade agreement with Iceland, a nation of just 330,000 people. The agreement covers goods and certain services, including engineering, telecommunications, tourism, and transportation. In 2018, the two countries signed a major agreement for the development of geothermal energy. Meanwhile, nearly all Arctic States have begun drilling for oil on their respective continental shelves, which are especially rich in natural gas and oil reserves. The progressive melting of Arctic ice, driven by global warming, has also underscored the region’s growing importance as a key trade route linking Europe with Japan and other Asian economies. At the same time, the expansion of ice-free waters is expected to boost fishing across vast areas of the Arctic Ocean, governed both by the national jurisdictions of the Arctic States and the laws applicable to the high seas. 

These developments should, looking ahead, encourage broader cooperation—at least on issues with global impact, such as environmental protection, resource conservation, and energy production—through the inclusion, on a basis of substantial equality with the Arctic States, of countries that have an active interest in the Arctic. This prospect—advocated by a 2014 resolution of the European Parliament and more recently strongly supported by China—now appears remote, given current global tensions. 

 

 

Among the ongoing controversies, the most significant concern the Northeast and Northwest Passages. The Northeast Passage, which connects the North Sea to the Pacific Ocean via the Bering Strait, runs along Russia’s northern coast. Applying criteria contested by the United States, Russia has extended both its territorial sea and internal waters, claiming historical jurisdiction. As a result, the entire passage would fall within its coastal waters, allowing Russia to require transiting ships to obtain an expensive permit and to monitor their compliance with its regulations. A similar dispute exists between the United States and Canada over the Northwest Passage, essentially a mirror image of the Russian case. Canada considers the entire passage to lie within its internal waters, thus subjecting transiting vessels to Canadian control. The United States has consistently contested this claim, a position also supported by the European Union.