China’s 15th Five Year Plan (FYP) will be released in March and will set out a vision for the Chinese economy and energy policies through 2030. While the details of the FYP are still being finalised, some guidance around key themes is already emerging, most notably in the Recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development (Recommendations document), which was published after the Chinese Communist Party’s fourth plenum in late October 2025.

Based on this document as well as other policy documents and leadership speeches, the FYP is likely to include an emphasis on energy independence, resilience and system flexibility as well as decarbonisation. The speed and scale of decarbonisation will, however, depend on progress in other areas. 

 

 

Context matters

The 15th FYP is a continuation of the previous decade in policy planning. Both the 13th (2016-2020) and 14th FYPs (2021-2025) prioritised large-scale renewable deployment but they viewed the energy transition through the prism of clean air and industrial policy. China’s efforts to develop a large renewable manufacturing base has enabled the rapid roll out of cleantech, while international pressure to reduce emissions through tools such as the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) drove efforts to decarbonise industry. The 14th FYP added the focus on emission reductions with President Xi Jinping’s pledge in 2020 that China would peak emissions by 2030 and strive for carbon neutrality by 2060 (the “dual carbon” goals). Officials then introduced more ambitious non-fossil fuel targets alongside pledges to “strictly control” new coal power additions in China; a ban on new coal plants overseas and tentative commitments to phase out coal use in the 15th FYP. 
 

A boost to industrial decarbonisation

But the 14th FYP coincided with a period of significant market turbulence and geopolitical re-alignment: the COVID pandemic, power outages in China in 2021, the Russian invasion of Ukraine as well as rising use of economic statecraft and deepening US-China tensions. During this period, China doubled down on solidifying domestic supply chains, on increasing its centrality in global supply chains including by growing its cleantech production base as well as renewable and electric vehicle (EV) deployment. Central to this were efforts to reduce its exposure to the US (where possible) in part by supporting sanction-evasion mechanisms.

The framing of the 15th FYP suggests that competition with the US will be a core feature of the Chinese economic and energy system in the coming years, with energy serving these economic ambitions. As such, the focus is on locally produced energy, electrification and, ideally, affordable and low carbon electricity. Since the Chinese leadership maintains its target of doubling 2020 per-capita GDP by 2035, this would imply roughly 4.5 percent annual GDP growth. The current macroeconomic strategy and the Recommendations Document suggest that investment-heavy economic growth will remain a key priority through the late 2020s and, given the downturn in the real estate sector, new industries such as cleantech are driving forces of economic expansion. Energy policy, in turn, is harnessed to this agenda and to the need to deliver industrial leadership and technological self-reliance all aimed at reducing exposure to US pressure. The Chinese leadership will continue to prioritise macro stability, energy security and industrial policy. Any additional climate ambition will be contingent on not endangering those goals. 

 

 

Continuity and change

With the global momentum to fight climate change weakening and due to China’s own renewed focus on supply security, coal fired-power plant approvals surged after 2022 and efforts to “strictly control” coal have been downplayed. As a result of the coal buildout, and of the volatility in energy supply and demand during the 14th FYP, China’s aim to reduce emissions intensity by 18 percent between 2020 and 2025 has not been met. At the end of 2024, carbon intensity is estimated to have declined by around 12 percent, suggesting that China will fall short of its goals. 

 

 

The Recommendations Document confirms the shift from controlling energy consumption and intensity to controlling carbon emissions and intensity. During the 14th FYP, Beijing issued a “dual control” system which included a limit on total energy consumption and on energy intensity (energy use per unit of GDP). But that “dual control” system treated all energy as equal, so provinces still favoured coal. Moreover, the focus on energy intensity meant that emissions could still rise alongside GDP growth. In the 14th FYP then, total energy use, coal capacity and emissions kept rising. Going forward, carbon rather than energy is the core metric. This should lead provincial authorities to prioritise low-carbon energy sources. The 15th FYP is also expected to add a total emissions cap, although it is unclear how it will be designed and how it will factor in or make up for the missed 2025 intensity target.

The decarbonisation agenda will also be boosted by expanding the national emissions trading system into sectors such as steel, cement and chemicals and gradually tightening allocation benchmarks. It will be coupled with energy efficiency standards and green financing tools aimed at supporting industrial decarbonisation. Finally, the recommendations also include, for the first time, language on peaking coal and oil consumption during the 15th FYP, but they do not set a specific peak year or repeat earlier formulation about phasing down coal consumption. Just as in previous FYPs, coal remains the backbone of the Chinese energy system and will only be phased down when China’s leaders estimate that the system is resilient enough.

This duality between ambition and caution was also reflected in China’s nationally determined contribution (NDC) for 2035: it included a pledge to cut emissions by 7-10 percent from an undefined peak, a target that falls short of a Paris-aligned roadmap. It also pledged to reach 3,600 GW of installed wind and solar capacity, although that implies much slower annual additions than those seen over the past two years. The pledge might be designed to underpromise and overachieve, but it sends mixed messages both within China and internationally.  

 

 

It’s the supply

Both electrification and decarbonisation are set to advance, especially since they can support industrial upgrading, economic growth, and geopolitical leverage. China’s vast cleantech manufacturing capacity can also be seen as a source of “soft green power” abroad.

But none of this is possible without supply security and affordable energy at home. The 15th FYP is therefore set to focus on domestic supply : increasing domestic coal, oil and gas output, expanding crude stocks, diversifying crude and gas imports, and tightening control over critical minerals and processing.

Chinese companies have successfully increased domestic oil and gas production over the course of the 14th FYP. Efforts to sustain domestic output will likely continue in the 15th FYP, albeit in a different context. During the 14th FYP period, China accounted for almost half of global oil product demand growth. But now, oil product demand has peaked. Gasoline and diesel demand are declining due to rapid electrification and fuel switching, offsetting any gains in jet demand. Petrochemical demand is still rising, though, suggesting that crude imports will not decline materially, but are also not expected to surge. Beijing’s exposure to crude markets is not declining, but it is also not rising as significantly. Still, in order to limit price and supply shock exposure, Beijing has been actively and aggressively stockpiling crude. These trends may well continue throughout the 15th FYP.

Growing domestic gas production will also remain a focal point for the government, although there is limited guidance so far on the role gas should play in the country’s energy transition. Currently, gas accounts for roughly 10 percent of China’s energy mix and while there is room for demand to grow, gas faces competition from other fuels. Electrification is accelerating in industry, while some industrial uses are slowing down due to structural changes in the economy. E ven though gas demand in industry will likely increase due to demand from industrial activity, it remains to be seen if the government will issue new fuel-switching mandates away from coal. Similarly, in the power sector, gas plays a marginal role in generation, accounting for under 5 percent in 2025. Coal capacity is being retrofitted to be able to provide flexibility to deal with the intermittency of renewables. In some provinces, gas plays an important role in power generation, but for many other regions that are installing renewables, imported gas is struggling to compete with coal or batteries.
 

To date, there are few concrete statements about gas in the policy guidance

While it is considered a clean fuel, and will therefore play a role in China’s energy transition, policies to date have been enabling gas use only when supplies and prices are competitive. The question for the 15th FYP is how much more gas will come into the energy mix, and will its share rise to 15 percent or to a more modest 12-13 percent by 2030?

Given the importance of electrification, the power sector is at the heart of China’s ambition and vulnerabilities. The 15th FYP will mark a pivot from megawatt targets to system design: grids, storage, flexibility and market reform will be elevated as priorities. On one hand, efforts to move toward provincial auctions and markets will continue, but on the other, China’s power markets will remain dominated by mid- and long-term contracts, with thin spot trading and extensive support mechanisms that keep coal in the generation mix. If the leadership achieves its goal of a unified national power market (rather than provincial silos) that incorporates some price-driven efficiencies, the share of coal could fall significantly. But reliance on command and control measures and failure to break down regional barriers could create more significant coal lock-in.